A workshop on inner awareness in the context of monistic theories of phenomenal consciousness
The Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague
September 10-12, 2026 (to be confirmed)
Keynote speakers:
Robert J. Howell (Rice)
Anna Giustina (Valencia)
Sam Coleman (Birkbeck)
Phenomenal consciousness is the property due to which there is something it’s like for an organism to be in various mental states. While the debate so far has mainly focused on the nature of the qualitative features one encounters in being phenomenally conscious (e.g. the bitterness of espresso, the feel of mental effort, etc.), our workshop will focus on the nature of this encounter itself, i.e. of the special ‘inner’ awareness (Brentano, Kriegel) one seems to be afforded of their own qualitative states, due to which these states are ‘for’ their subject, instantiating what Joseph Levine has called ‘subjectivity’. Since it’s unclear whether and how this subjectivity of conscious states can be accounted for reductively, we view its existence as an important challenge for the main forms of monism, i.e. physicalism and Russellian monism. The aim of our workshop is to bring together leading thinkers working on inner, or ‘subjective’, awareness, with those who defend various forms of monism, and address the ‘subjectivity challenge’ in a systematic manner, examining its viability and significance in a broader context of consciousness studies.
We aim to examine the following questions, among others:
- Is it plausible that the qualitative character of consciousness can be distinguished from our inner awareness of it? If so, is this a metaphysical, or merely conceptual distinction?
- What is the most promising representationalist approach to inner awareness? Does representationalism about inner awareness face any challenges and, if so, are there any viable alternatives to it?
- Russellian monists posit ‘inscrutable’ properties which arguably enable them to account for phenomenal consciousness. But can inscrutables also help them account for inner awareness/subjectivity?
- Are there forms of physicalism, Russellian monism, or monism in general that are particularly well positioned to handle the challenge of accounting for inner awareness/subjectivity?
- Is inner awareness itself phenomenologically manifest? If so, what is the nature of its phenomenological contribution and how does it relate to other, e.g. sensory, sorts of phenomenology?
- If (Russellian) panpsychism is true, subjects might be ever-present. But can this view make sense of human-level inner awareness being grounded in fundamental experiences?
- Does neuroscientific or psychological research support the distinction between subjectivity (i.e. inner awareness), and qualitative character? If so, does it offer us any hints as to how the subjectivity challenge should be addressed?
- What is the relation between subjectivity (i.e. inner awareness), and introspection?
Call for Papers – to be announced in March 2026
The workshop will result in an edited volume published with an international publisher, featuring, in particular, the contributions of the keynote speakers, as well as papers by other participants and by experts in the field.